Abstract
Introduction
We consider 2-player non-zero-sum games, i.e., nonstrictly competitive games. A possible behavior of the two players is captured by a strategy profile´ µ, where is a strategy of player 1, and is a strategy of player 2. Classically, the behavior´ µ is considered rational if the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium [7] -that is, if neither player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing £ This research was supported in part by the ONR grant N00014-02- for all player 2 strategies ¼ . Nash equilibria formalize a notion of rationality which is strictly internal: each player cares about her own payoff but does not in the least care (cooperatively or adversarially) about the other player's payoff.
Choosing among Nash equilibria.
A classical problem is that many games have multiple Nash equilibria, and some of them may be preferable to others. For example, one might partially order the equilibria by´ . If a unique maximal Nash equilibrium exists in this order, then it is preferable for both players. However, maximal Nash equilibria may not be unique. In these cases external criteria, such as the sum of the payoffs for both players, have been used to evaluate different rational behaviors [9, 14] . These external criteria, which are based on a single preference order on strategy profiles, are usually cooperative, in that they capture social aspects of rational behavior. We define and study, instead, an adversarial external criterion for rational behavior. Put simply, we assume that each player attempts to minimize the other player's payoff as long as, by doing so, she does not decrease her own payoff. This yields two different preference orders on strategy profiles, one for each player, and gives rise to a new notion of equilibrium.
Adversarial external choice. According to our notion of rationality, among two strategy profiles´ µ and´ . In other words, the preference order ½ of player 1 is lexicographic: the primary goal of player 1 is to maximize her own payoff; the secondary goal is to minimize the opponent's payoff. The preference order ¾ of player 2 is defined symmetrically. It should be noted that, defined in this way, adversarial external choice cannot be internalized uniformly over all games by first changing the payoff functions of the two players, and then using traditional Nash equilibria: if Ú ½ Ú ¼ . Note that every secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but a Nash equilibrium need not be secure. The name "secure" equilibrium derives from the following equivalent characterization. We say that a strategy profile´ µ is secure if any rational deviation of player 2 -i.e., a deviation that does not decrease her payoff-will not decrease the payoff of player 1, and symmetrically, any rational deviation of player 1 will not decrease the payoff of player 2. Formally,´ µ is secure if for all player 2
, and for all player 1 strategies
The secure profile´ µ can thus be interpreted as a contract between the two players which enforces cooperation: any unilateral selfish deviation by one player cannot put the other player at a disadvantage if she follows the contract. It is not difficult to show (see Section 2) that a strategy profile is a secure equilibrium iff it is both a secure profile and a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the secure equilibria are those Nash equilibria which represent enforceable contracts between the two players.
Motivation: verification of component-based systems.
The motivation for our definitions comes from verification. There, one would like to prove that a component of a system (player 1) can satisfy a specification no matter how the environment (player 2) behaves [3] . Classically, this is modeled as a strictly competitive (zero-sum) game, where the environment's objective is the complement of the component's objective. However, the zero-sum model is often naive, as the environment itself typically consists of components, each with its own specification (i.e., objective). Moreover, the individual component specifications are usually not complementary; a common example is that each component must maintain a local invariant. So a more appropriate approach is to prove that player 1 can meet her objective no matter how player 2 behaves as long as player 2 does not sabotage her own objective. In other words, classical correctness proofs of a component assume absolute worst-case behavior of the environment, while it would suffice to assume only relative worst-case behavior of the environment -namely, relative to the assumption that the environment Figure 1 . A reachability graph game.
itself is correct (i.e., meets its specification). Such relative worst-case reasoning is called assume-guarantee reasoning [1, 2, 13] , but so far has not been studied in the natural setting offered by game theory.
Existence and uniqueness of maximal secure equilibria.
We will see that in general games, such as matrix games, there may be multiple secure equilibrium payoff profiles, even several incomparable maximal ones. However, the games that occur in verification have a special form. They are played on directed graphs whose nodes represent system states, and whose edges represent system transitions. The nodes are partitioned into two sets: in player 1 nodes, the first player chooses an outgoing edge, and in player 2 nodes, the second player chooses an outgoing edge. By repeating these choices ad infinitum, an infinite path through the graph is formed, which represents a system trace. The objective ³ of each player is a set of infinite paths; for example, an invariant (or "safety") objective is the set of infinite paths that do not visit unsafe states. Each player attempts to satisfy her objective ³ by choosing a strategy that ensures that the outcome of the game lies in the set ³ . The objective ³ is typically an -regular set (specified, e.g., in temporal logic), or more generally, a Borel set [8] in the Cantor topology on infinite paths. We call these games 2-player non-zero-sum graph games with Borel objectives. Our main result shows that for these games, which may have multiple maximal Nash equilibria, there always exists a unique maximal secure equilibrium payoff profile. In other words, in graph games with Borel objectives there is a compelling notion of rational behavior for each player, which is (1) a classical Nash equilibrium, (2) an enforceable contract ("secure"), and (3) a guarantee of maximal payoff for each player among all behaviors that achieve (1) and (2).
Examples. Consider the game graph shown in Fig. 1 reaches her target). The strategy profiles´ ½ ¾ µ,´ ¾ ½ µ, and´ ¾ ¾ µ give the payoffs (1,1), (0,0), and (0,0), respectively. All four strategy profiles are Nash equilibria; for example, in´ ½ ½ µ player 1 does not have an incentive to switch to strategy ¾ (which would still give her payoff 0), and neither does player 2 have an incentive to switch to ¾ (she is already getting payoff 1). However, the strategy profile´ ½ ½ µ is not a secure equilibrium, because player 2 can lower player 1's payoff (from 1 to 0) without changing her own payoff, namely, by switching to strategy ¾ . Similarly, the strategy profile´ ½ ¾ µ is not secure, because player 1 can lower player 2's payoff without changing her own payoff, by switching to ½ . So if both players, in addition to maximizing their own payoff, also attempt to minimize the opponents payoff, then the resulting payoff profile is unique, namely, (0,0). In other words, in this game, the only rational behavior for both players is to deny each other's objectives. This is not always the case: sometimes it is beneficial for both players to cooperate to achieve their own objectives, with the result that both players win. Consider the game graph shown in Fig. 2 × ¿ . It follows that for purely selfish motives (and not some social reason), both players have an incentive to cooperate to achieve the maximal secure equilibrium payoff (1,1).
Outline and results. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of secure equilibrium and provide two interpretations through alternative definitions. In Section 3 we prove the existence and uniqueness of maximal secure equilibria in graph games with Borel objectives. The proof is based on the following classification of strategies. A player 1 strategy is called strongly winning if it ensures that player 1 wins and player 2 loses (i.e., the outcome of the game satisfies ³ ½ ³ ¾ ). A player 1 strategy is retaliating if it ensures that player 1 wins if player 2 wins (i.e., the outcome satisfies ³ ¾ ³ ½ ). In other words, a retaliating strategy for player 1 ensures that if player 2 causes player 1 to lose, then player 2 will lose too. If both players follow retaliating strategies´ µ, they may both win -in this case, we say that´ µ is a winning pair of retaliating strategies-or they may both lose. We show that at every node of a graph game with Borel objectives, either one of the two players has a strongly winning strategy, or there is a pair of retaliating strategies. In all four cases -existence of a strongly winning strategy for player 1, or for player 2, or existence of a winning or losing pair of retaliating strategies-these strategies specify a unique maximal secure payoff profile. Based on this insight, we give an algorithm for computing the secure equilibria in graph games in the case that both players' objectives are -regular. In Section 4, we analyze the memory requirements of strongly winning and retaliating strategies in graph games with -regular objectives. Our results (in Tables 1 and 2 ) consider safety, reachability, Büchi, co-Büchi, and general parity objectives. We show that strongly winning and retaliating strategies often require memory, even in the simple case that a player pursues a reachability objective. In Section 5, we generalize the notion of secure equilibria from 2-player to Ò-player games. We show that there can be multiple maximal secure equilibria in 3-player graph games with reachability objectives.
Secure Equilibria
In a secure game the objective of player 1 is to maximize her own payoff and then minimize the payoff of player 2. Similarly, player 2 maximizes her own payoff and then minimizes the payoff of player 1. We want to determine the best payoff that each player can ensure when both players play according to these preferences. We formalize this as follows. A strategy profile´ µ is a pair of strategies, where is a player 1 strategy and is a player 2 strategy. The strategy profile´ µ gives rise to a payoff profile´Ú ½ Ú ¾ µ, where Ú ½ is the payoff of player 1 if the two players follow the strategies and , respectively, and Ú ¾ is the corresponding payoff of player 2. We define the player 1 preference order ½ and the player 2 preference order ¾ on payoff profiles lexicographically:
is, player 1 prefers a payoff profile that gives her a greater payoff, and if two payoff profiles give her the same payoff, then she prefers the payoff profile in which player 2's payoff is lower; symmetrically,
Definition 1 (Secure strategy profiles). A strategy profile
´ µ is secure if the following two conditions hold:
A secure strategy for player 1 ensures that if player 2 tries to decrease player 1's payoff, then player 2's payoff decreases as well, and vice versa.
Definition 2 (Secure equilibria). A strategy profile´
µ is a secure equilibrium if the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium and it is secure.
Lemma 1 (Equivalent characterization).
The strategy profile´ µ is a secure equilibrium iff the following two conditions hold:
Hence, in a secure equilibrium´ µ, neither player ¾ ½ ¾ has an incentive to switch from the strategy profilé µ to increase the payoff profile according to her individual payoff profile ordering .
Example 1 (Matrix games).
A secure equilibrium need not exist in a matrix game. We give an example of a matrix game where no Nash equilibrium is secure. Consider the game Å ½ below, where the row player can choose row 1 or row 2 (denoted Ö ½ and Ö ¾ , respectively), and the column player chooses between the two columns (denoted ½ and ¾ ). The first component of the payoff is the row player payoff, and the second component is the column player payoff.
Å ½ ´¿ ¿µ´½ ¿μ ¿ ½µ´¾ ¾µ
In this game the strategy profile´Ö ½ ½ µ is the only Nash equilibrium. But´Ö ½ ½ µ is not a secure strategy profile, because if the row player plays Ö ½ , then the column player playing ¾ can still get payoff 3 and decrease the row player's payoff to 1.
Also multiple secure equilibria can exist, as is the case, for example, in a matrix game where all entries of the matrix are the same. Third, below is an example of a matrix game with multiple secure equilibria but without a unique maximal secure payoff profile.
Å ¿ ´¾ ½µ´¼ ¼μ ¼ ¼µ´½ ¾µ
The strategy profiles´Ö ½ ½ µ and´Ö ¾ ¾ µ are both secure equilibria. The former has the payoff profile´¾ ½µ and the latter has the payoff profile´½ ¾µ.
2-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games on Graphs
We consider 2-player infinite path-forming games played on graphs. A game graph Î µ ´Î ½ Î ¾ µµ consists of a directed graph´Î µ, where Î is the set of states (vertices) and is the set of edges, and a partition´Î ½ Î ¾ µ of the states. For technical convenience we assume that every state has at least one outgoing edge. The two players, player 1 and player 2, keep moving a token along the edges of the game graph: player 1 moves the token from states in Î ½ , and player 2 moves the token from states in Î ¾ . A play is an infinite path ª 
Given a state × ¾ Î , a strategy of player 1, and a strategy of player 2, there is a unique play ª ´×µ, the outcome of the game, which starts from × and is consistent with both and .
Objectives of the players are specified generally as sets In verification, objectives are usually -regular sets. The -regular sets occur in the low levels of the Borel hierarchy (in ¦ ¿ ¥ ¿ ) and form a robust and expressive class for determining the payoffs of commonly used system specifications [10, 16] .
We consider non-zero-sum games on graphs. Similarly, we sometimes refer to Nash equilibria and secure strategy profiles of the graph game´ × ³ ½ ³ ¾ µ as equilibria and secure profiles at the state ×.
Unique maximal secure equilibria
Consider a game graph with state set Î , and Borel objectives ³ ½ and ³ ¾ for the two players. 
We now define the notions of strongly winning and retaliating strategies, which capture the essence of secure equilibria. A strategy for player 1 is strongly winning if it ensures that the objective of player 1 is satisfied and the objective of player 2 is not. A retaliating strategy for player 1 ensures that for every strategy of player 2, if the objective of player 2 is satisfied, then the objective of player 1 is satisfied as well. We will show that every secure equilibrium either contains a strongly winning strategy for one of the players, or it consists of a pair of retaliating strategies.
Definition 4 (Strongly winning strategies).
A strategy is strongly winning for player 1 from a state × if she can ensure the payoff profile´½ ¼µ in the game´ × ³ ½ ³ ¾ µ by playing the strategy . Formally, is strongly winning for player 1 if for all player 2 strategies , we have ª ´×µ ´³ ½ ³ ¾ µ. The strongly winning strategies for player 2 are defined symmetrically.
Definition 5 (Retaliating strategies).
A strategy is a retaliating strategy for player 1 from a state × if for all player 2 strategies , we have ª ´×µ 3 ¾ ³ ½ µ. Similarly, a strategy is a retaliating strategy for player 2 from × if for all player 1 strategies , we have ª ´×µ 3 ½ ³ ¾ µ.
We write Ê ½´× µ and Ê ¾´× µ to denote the sets of retaliating strategies for player 1 and player 2 from ×. A strategy profile´ µ is a retaliation strategy profile at a state × if both and are retaliating strategies from ×.
Example 2 (Büchi-Büchi game).
Recall the game shown in Fig. 2 µ consists of a pair of winning retaliating strategies, as it satisfies the Büchi objectives of both players. If instead, player 2 always chooses × ¼ × ¿ , and player 1 always chooses × ¾ × ¿ , we obtain a memoryless retaliation strategy profile, which is not winning for either player: it is a Nash equilibrium at state × ¼ with the payoff profile´¼ ¼µ. Finally, suppose that at × ¼ player 2 always chooses × ¾ , and at × ¾ player 1 always chooses × ¼ . This strategy profile is again a Nash equilibrium, with the payoff profile´¼ ½µ at × ¼ , but not a retaliation strategy profile. This shows that at state × ¼ the Nash equilibrium payoff profiles´¼ ½µ,´¼ ¼µ, and´½ ½µ are possible, but only´¼ ¼µ and´½ ½µ are secure.
Definition 6 (Winning sets).
We define the following state sets in terms of strongly winning and retaliating strategies.
The sets of states where player 1 or player 2 have a strongly winning strategy, denoted by Ï ½¼ and Ï ¼½ , respectively: 
Algorithmic characterization
We now give an alternative characterization of the sets Ï ¼¼ , Ï ¼½ , Ï ½¼ , and Ï ½½ . The new characterization is useful to derive computational complexity results for computing the four sets when player 1 and player 2 have -regular objectives. The characterization itself, however, is general and applies to all objectives specified as Borel sets. Ò Í , player 1 (resp. player 2) has a strategy (resp. ) to satisfy the objective ³ ¾ (resp. ³ ½ ) from the state ×. We define a pair´ · · µ of strategies from × as follows. Let Ü ¾ £ be a prefix of a play.
As soon as the play reaches a state Ø ¾ Í , the players follow their winning retaliating strategies from Ø. It follows from Lemma 8 that Í Ï ½½ .
If Ü ¾´ Ò Í µ £ , that is, if the play has not yet reached the set Í , then player 1 uses the strategy and player 2 uses the strategy . If, however, player 2 deviates from the strategy , then player 1 switches to the strategy from the first state after the deviation, and symmetrically, if player 1 deviates from , then player 2 switches to the .
It is not hard to argue that both strategies´ · µ and´ · µ are retaliating strategies and ª · · ´×µ ´³ ½ ³ ¾ µ, because ª · · ´×µ ª ´×µ.
because for every strategy profile´ µ we have either ª ´×µ ³ ½ or ª ´×µ ³ ¾ .
We now define two forms of -regular objectives, Rabin and parity objectives. Every -regular set can be defined as a parity objective [17] . It follows from Lemma 9 that in order to compute the sets Ï ½¼ , Ï ¼½ , Ï ½½ , and Ï ¼¼ , it suffices to solve two games with conjunctive objectives and a model-checking (1-player) problem for a conjunctive objective. If the objectives ³ ½ and ³ ¾ are -regular sets specified as parity objectives, then the conjunctions can be expressed as the complement of a Rabin objective [17] . This gives the following result. (The size of a game graph is Î · ). 
-Regular Objectives
In this section we consider special cases of graph games, where the two players have reachability, safety, Büchi, coBüchi, and parity objectives. We fix a game graph with state space Î . Given state sets Ê Ë Î , these objectives are defined as follows. A strategy is a winning retaliating strategy for player 1 at state × if there is a strategy for player 2 such that´ µ is a winning retaliation strategy profile at ×. Until the end of this section, let ³ Ê be a reachability objective, ³ Ë a safety objective, ³ a Büchi objective, ³ a co-Büchi objective, and ³ È a parity objective. Note that ³ Ê is a safety objective; ³ Ë is a reachability objective; ³ is a Büchi objective; and ³ is a co-Büchi objective. Moreover, ³ È and ³ Ë ³ È and ³ ³ È are all parity objectives. While in zero-sum games played on graphs, memoryless winning strategies exists for all parity objectives [6] , this is not the case for non-zero-sum games. The following two theorems give a complete characterization. Proof. For player 1, strongly winning a non-zero-sum game with objectives ³ ½ and ³ ¾ is equivalent to winning a zero-sum game with the objective ³ ½ ³ ¾ . It is easy to observe that the objective ³ ½ ³ ¾ is equivalent to a parity × ½ × ¾ × ¿ Figure 3 . A counterexample for memoryless strongly winning strategies.
objective for all "·" entries in Table 1 , except for safetyreachability, safety-safety, and reachability-reachability games. For these three cases, it is easy to argue that memoryless strongly winning strategies exist. The other "·" entries follow from the existence of memoryless winning strategies for zero-sum parity games [6] . We now show that player 1 does not necessarily have a memoryless strongly winning strategy in non-zero-sum games with " " entries in Table 1 . It suffices to give counterexamples for the following four cases: co-Büchi-safety, Büchi-safety, reachability-safety, and Büchi-coBüchi games.
The cases of reachability-Büchi and reachability-co-Büchi games follow from the former two cases, respectively, by symmetry. The cases of Büchi-parity and parity-parity games follow trivially from the Büchi-co-Büchi case, and the case of parity-safety games follows trivially from the Büchi-safety case. The game graph of For the co-Büchi-safety case, the player 1 strategy that chooses × ½ × ¿ for the first time and then always chooses × ½ × ¾ is strongly winning at the state × ½ , but the two possible memoryless strategies are not strongly winning. For all other cases, the player 1 strategy that alternates between the two moves available at × ½ is strongly winning, but again the two memoryless strategies are not. there would be a state in Ï ½½ Ò Í ½ in which the objective ³ Ê of player 2 is satisfied and player 2 has a strategy to satisfy ³ È , and hence the state belongs to Ï ¼½ ; this however contradicts Ï ½½ Ï ¼½ . Therefore, as long as a play stays in Ï ½½ Ò Í ½ , the objective ³ Ê cannot be satisfied.
On the other hand, if player 2 cooperates with player 1 in reaching Í ½ , then player 1 plays her memoryless retaliating strategy in Í ½ . The proof for safety-parity games is similar.
There, the key observation is that Ï ½½ Ò Í ½ Ë, where ³ Ë is the safety objective of player 1.
We now argue that player 1 does not have memoryless winning retaliating strategies in games with " " entries in Table 2 . It suffices to give counterexamples for the nine cases that result from co-Büchi, Büchi, or reachability objectives for player 1, and Büchi, co-Büchi, or safety objectives for player 2. The remaining seven cases involving parity objectives follow as corollaries, because Büchi and co-Büchi objectives are special cases of parity objectives. The game graph of 
Conclusion
We considered non-zero-sum graph games with lexicographically ordered objectives for the players in order to capture adversarial external choice, where each player tries to minimize the other player's payoff as long as it does not decrease her own payoff. We showed that these games have a unique maximal equilibrium for all Borel winning conditions. This confirms that secure equilibria provide a good formalization of rational behavior in the context of verifying component-based systems.
Concretely, suppose the two players represent two components of a system with the specifications ³ ½ and ³ ¾ , respectively. Classically, componentwise verification would prove that for an initial state ×, player 1 can satisfy the objective ³ ½ no matter what player 2 does (i.e., × ¾ ½ ½ ), and player 2 can satisfy the objective ³ ¾ no matter what player 1 does (i.e., × ¾ ¾ ¾ ). Together, these two proof obligations imply that the composite system satisfies both specifications ³ ½ and ³ ¾ . The computational gain from this method typically arises from abstracting the opposing player's (i.e., the environment's) moves for each proof obligation. Our framework provides two weaker proof obligations that support the same conclusion. We first show that player 1 can satisfy ³ ½ provided that player 2 does not sabotage her ability to satisfy ³ ¾ , that is, we show that × ¾´Ï ½¼ Ï ½½ µ: either player 1 has a strongly winning strategy, or there is a winning pair of retaliation strategies. This condition is strictly weaker than the condition that player 1 has a winning strategy, and therefore it is satisfied by more states. Second, we show the symmetric proof obligation that player 2 can satisfy ³ ¾ provided that player 1 does not sabotage her ability to satisfy ³ ½ , that is, × ¾´Ï ¼½ Ï ½½ µ. While they are weaker than their classical counterparts, both new proof obligations together still suffice to establish that × ¾ Ï ½½ , that is, the composite system satisfies ³ ½ ³ ¾ assuming that both players behave rationally and follow the winning pair of retaliation strategies. It should be noted that the other possible lexicographic ordering of objectives captures cooperative external choice, where each player tries to maximize the other player's payoff as long as it does not decrease her own payoff. However, cooperation does not uniquely determine a preferable behavior: there may be multiple maximal payoff profiles for cooperative external choice, even for reachability ½ ¼µ, and the latter has the payoff profile´¼ ½µ. These are the only cooperative equilibria and, therefore, the maximal payoff profile for cooperative equilibria is not unique.
